Land & Water Law Review
Volume 4

Issue 2

Article 9

1969

The State Navigation Servitude
Daniel J. Morgan
David G. Lewis

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water

Recommended Citation
Morgan, Daniel J. and Lewis, David G. (1969) "The State Navigation Servitude," Land & Water Law Review:
Vol. 4 : Iss. 2 , pp. 521 - 538.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol4/iss2/9

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Land & Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming
Scholarship.

Morgan and Lewis: The State Navigation Servitude

THE STATE NAVIGATION SERVITUDE
INTRODUCTION

It is fundamental in American jurisprudence that private
property shall not be taken by the state without just compensation, by virtue of the Fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution.1 A seeming exception to this general rule of
compensation is the exercise of what is commonly referred
to as the navigation servitude. Under this doctrine riparian
rights subject to the servitude may be eliminated or their use
limited without compensation. 2 Up to this point, writings on
the doctrine of navigation servitude have generally dealt with
the principles and application of the federal doctrine.' Only
recently, especially since the California decision of Colberg,
Inc. v. State, has there been direct interest among legal
scholars on the subject of the state navigation servitude
doctrine In light of this apparent "discovery" of a state
navigation servitude doctrine, analysis of the major cases
involving this servitude will be needed to determine the general
scope of its application.
Ever since Chief Justice Marshall, in Gibbons v. Ogden,'
interpreted the commerce clause7 to include navigation, the
federal government has had the power to regulate all navigable
rivers in the United States. Though this comment is not
concerned with the navigation servitude of the federal government,' it must be made clear at the outset that the state
navigation servitude is subordinate to that of the federal
government.9 Accordingly, if the federal government has not
exercised its servitude, there is nothing in the federal constitution to prevent a state from regulating and controlling the
ownership of the navigable waters within its boundaries and
1. U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
2. For a complete overview of the Federal doctrine, see Morreale, Federal
Power in Western Waters: The Navigation Power and the Rule of No
For a review citing
Compensation, 3 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 1 (1963).
many of the state cases cited in this article see: Comment, 72 DICK. L. REV.
375 (1968).
3. Morreale, supra note 2. Powell, Just Compensation and the Navigation
Power, 31 WASH. L. REV. 271 (1956). Sato, Water Resources-Comments
Upon the Federal-StateRelationship,48 CALIF. L. REv. 43 (1960).
4. 62 Cal. Rptr. 401, 432 P.2d 3 (1967).
5. Comment, 72 DICK. L. REV., supra note 2; Comment, 19 CASE WESTERN RES.
L. REv. 1116 (1968); Comment, 25 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 323 (1968).
6. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824).
7. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
8. See: Morreale, supra note 2.
9. Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897).
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thus exercising a servitude over the land on which the waters
flow.'" It is with this in mind that we proceed to examine
the scope and character of the navigation servitude.
State Navigation Servitude Defined
The rights of a riparian landowner in the waters of a
navigable stream and in the underlying bed are subject to
an easement in favor of the public to use the water for navigation. As a consequence, the rights of the riparian landowner can be defined only when the total effect of the navigation servitude upon his property is also clearly defined.
This servitude or easement is defined in its generally stated
and classically accepted form as follows:
Whatever the nature of the interest of the riparian
owner in the submerged lands in front of his upland
bordering on a public navigable water, his title is
not as full and complete as his title to fast land which
has no direct connection with the navigation of such
water. It is a qualified title, a bare technical title,
not at his absolute disposal, as is his upland, but to
be held at all times subordinate to such use of the
submerged lands and of the waters flowing over
them as may be consistent with or demanded by the
public right of navigation."
Given this general rule, one could logically infer there
from the following general propositions: 1) a taking in the
aid of navigation of riparian property, including a right of
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1893); Pacific Gas Improvement Co. v.
Ellert, 64 F. 421 (C.C. N.D. Cal. 1894).
11. Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900). Though this case concerned
the federal navigation servitude, the definition is in accord with those
offered by the state courts. See, for example, Colberg Inc. v. State, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 401, 432 P.2d 3, 13 (1967) : "Finally, we emphasize that the state
servitude upon lands riparian or littoral to navigable waters, like the
federal servitude burdening such lands, does not extend to cases wherein
the proper exercise of state power results in actual physical invasion of
or encroachment upon fast lands." See also, the following: Natcher v. City
of Bowling Green, 269 Ky. 584, 94 S.W.2d 255, 256 (1936), "In and on a
navigable stream, the title of riparian owners up to the ordinary high
water mark, and particularly of the bed and islands therein, is a qualified
one, for it is subject to the dominant rights of the public in the stream."
Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 202 Mass. 422, 89 N.E. 124, 125
(1909)-"The waters and the land under them beyond the line of private
ownership are held by the state, both as owner of the fee and as the
repository of sovereign power, with a perfect right of control in the interest
of the public. The right of the Legislature in these particulars has been
treated as paramount to all private rights, and subject only to the power
of the government of the United States to act in the interest of interstate
or foreign commerce."
10.
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access"2 below the high water mark, is a valid exercise of the
servitude and no compensation is required; 2) that a taking,
even though in the aid of navigation, which encroaches upon
the fast lands is a taking of private property in the constitutional sense and compensation is required; 3) that a taking
of a riparian landowner's property below the high water
mark, when not in the aid of navigation requires just compensation. These are, however, general rules and state the
status of the servitude in only a majority of our state jurisdictions. As will be shown, the scope of the navigation servitude in many jurisdictions is much broader than these propositions would indicate, as a result of either expanding the
classical definition or by disregarding it and finding different
sources of the power and deriving a broader scope therefrom.
Hence, the most that can be said as an introductory note
is that in order to ascertain whether there has been a taking
of riparian property, one must look to the respective state
law to find the status of the navigation servitude which will,
in turn, define the limits of the riparian's property rights.
For purposes of convenience and organization, the state
doctrines of navigation servitude have been categorically
grouped in the following scheme: 1) the general rule jurisdictions; 2) the public purpose jurisdictions; and 3) the
Louisiana exception. These categories are by no means clearcut, and indeed, as will become evident, there is much overlapping and consequent gray areas of the law. The scheme
does provide, however, an appropriate tool for studying the
state navigation servitude by putting each jurisdiction into
perspective so as to make manifest the distinctions in the
scope of the servitude.
General Rule:
The cases discussed in this section follow the general rule
as to interpretation of the state navigation servitude, illustrated by the following statement from the Kentucky case of
Natcher v. City of Bowling Green :13
12. 2 NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN, § 792 (3d ed. 1963); FARNHAM,
THE LAW OF WATERS § 66 (2d ed. 1904); State v. Masheter, 1 Ohio St. 2d
71, 203 N.E.2d 325 (1964) ; State v. Preston, 2 Ohio Op. 2d 244, 207 N.E.2d
664 (1963); Marine Air Ways v. State, 201 Misc. 849, 104 N.Y.S.2d 964
(1951), aff'd 280 App. Div. 1021; 116 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1952); Moore v.
State Road Dept., 171 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1965).
13. Natcher v. City of Bowling Green, 269 Ky. 584, 94 S.W.2d 255 (1936).
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If the sovereign in the exercise of its power improves
the streams for purposes of navigation, the individual's rights of property recede before the paramount power of improvement and development. 4
In the Natcher case, plaintiff's gravel bars, which were
above the level of a river for a substantial amount of time
each year, were submerged permanently when a city constructed a dam down-stream and backed up the river waters.
The court awarded compensation to the plaintiff on the ground
that since the primary purpose of the dam was to augment
the city's water supply, and navigation would be improved
only incidentally, the dam project was not "in aid of navigation" 5 and therefore the plaintiff was entitled to compensation.1"
Several other state jurisdictions following very closely
the "improvement of navigation" definition of the scope of
the navigation servitude as outlined in the Natcher case, are
Wisconsin, 7 Washington,"5 Rhode Island, 9 Ohio,2" Virginia,2 '
and Florida.2 2
14. 94 S.W.2d 255, 257.
15. Id. at 259-60.
16. It should be noted that a problem regarding the scope of the navigation
servitude may have been created by certain language used in the Natcher
opinion, that language being:
When.. ., under the plea of improvement of navigation the property
of a riparian owner is taken or its value diminished by a public
work unrelated to the purposes of navigation and not within but
wholly without the channel of the river and its public servitude,
there is a clear case for compensation. 95 S.W.2d 255, 259-60.
(Emphasis added)
After reading the above quote, one might be left with the impression that
if the public project was in aid of navigation, compensation might not
have been granted. If this was so, then the navigation servitude would
be extended to the actual physical encroachment of fast lands (the gravel
bars), which would be an unwarranted extension of the doctrine. However,
it is highly doubtful that such an extension was intended. Also in Natcher
the court noted: "[a] state may exercise plenary control over the navigable waters within its limits up to the ordinary high water mark." (Id.
at 260). Further, it is an accepted principle of the law of eminent domain
that "ownership of a riparian proprietor in such of his land as lies above
the high water mark . . . is as full and complete as the ownership of any
other private property .-. . and the public may not take it except for
public use and for just compensation." NICHOLS, supra note 12, at 238-39.
17. Green Bay Canal Co.. v. Kaukauna Water-Power Co., 90 Wis. 370, 61 N.W.
1121 (1895).
18. Conger v. Pierce County, 185 Cal. App. 565, 198 P. 377 (1921).
19. Clark v. Pecham, 10 R.I. 35, 14 Am. R. 654 (1871).
20. State v. Preston, 2 Ohio Op. 2d 244, 207 N.E.2d 664 (1963); State v.
Masheter, 1 Ohio St. 2d 11, 203 N.E. 2d 325 (1964).
21. Oliver v. City of Richmond, 105 Va. 538, 178 S.E. 48 (1935).
22. Webb v. Giddens, 82 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1955). In this decision the court held
that a state constructed highway which cut off a riparian's right of ingress
and egress required compensation for the loss. While recognizing a riparian
right of access vs. public right of navigation, the court failed to define the
navigation servitude. More specifically, no mention was made of the con-
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In New York, a broader statement of the general rule is
applied. In Crance v. State28 the state had construted a highway along a lake which cut off access to the lake from certain
riparian properties. The court awarded compensation to the
riparians on the basis of the following statement: "Where
the improvement, though for a ... public purpose, does not

involve an exercise of the sovereign reserve power over water2 4
ways as such, deprivation of riparian rights is compensable."

The court further explained that to be within the servitude,
the improvement must bear a relation to the development of
waterways,"2 and that projects "not in furtherance of the
development" 26 of waterways were outside of the servitude.
Thus, in New York, dam development and bank improvement
projects, though for power or flood control purposes and
hence not in aid of navigation, would come under the scope
of the servitude because they would be in furtherance of the
development of the waterway.
Another expansion of the general rule is illustrated by
the Iowa case of Peck v. Alfred Olsen Construction Co.27
In the Peck case, the court recited the typical "improvement
of navigation" rule. However, in its application of the rule
to the facts of the case, the court found that a bridge-like
structure extending out over a lake which was designed as
a turnaround area for automobiles was a structure in aid
of navigation, and hence, riparian rights of access which were
cut off by the structure were non-compensable. 8 To the
court's credit, it should be noted that there was a small pier
extending from the turnaround structure, but, even with that
addition, it strains the imagination to envision the structure
as an aid to navigation. If all projects were carte blanche considered as in the aid of navigation, the structures of the
stitutional taking of the right of access when done "in the aid of navigation," rather, the two rights were spoken of as if existing separately and
absolutely. There is probably little doubt that Florida follows the general
rule, but in light of the lack of navigation servitude language in two subsequent right of access vs. public right of navigation cases, to wit, Carmazi
v. Board of Comm'rs, 108 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1955), and Moore v. State Road
Dept., 171 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1965), the development of Florida's navigation
law could present American jurisprudence with one jurisdiction which has
no navigation servitude at all.
23. Crance v. State, 283 App. Div. 795, 128 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1954).
24. 128 N.Y.S.2d at 481.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Peck v. Alfred Olsen Constr. Co., 216 Iowa 519, 245 N.W. 131 (1932).
28. 245 N.W. 131, 137.
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general rule would have no relevance, and the court could
end up treating the general rule as a legal fiction, which would
seem to be avoiding the issue of compensability to riparians
under a cloud of legal dicta.
A far more conservative statement of the general rule
was made in the Massachusetts case of Michaelson v. Silver
Beach Improvement Ass'n Inc.2" in which it was stated that
there must be a "substantial and reasonable connection between the project and the public powers over navigation and
the fisheries," 3 before the project would be considered as
within the navigation servitude. To determine whether multifaceted projects should be within the servitude, the court set
up a test under which the other projects within the general
project must contribute to the part of the project involving
navigation or the fisheries so that enjoyment of the navigation-fishery project would be substantially impaired without the creation of the other projects." This test would
appear to demand a strict interpretation of the general rule.
Also, it establishes a definite judicial yardstick upon which
to measure the probabilities that a proposed project will or
will not fit under the servitude.
States following the general rule (subject to the Iowa
and New York exceptions previously discussed) will compensate riparian property owners for damages caused by projects
not in aid of navigation. Once the determination has been
made that the project is not in aid of navigation, a decision
must be made as to whether any of the claimant's private
property rights have been taken, and frequently, the decision
comes down to whether claimant's right of access has been
taken. While it is generally accepted that the right of access
is a private property right and that it extends to the channel
of the watercourse,32 it is also generally accepted that the
right of access does not extend to the navigation of the watercourse itself.3 Therefore, since the private right of access
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n Inc., 342 Mass. 251, 173
N.E.2d 273 (1961).
173 N.E.2d 273, 277.
Id.
NiCHOLS, supra note 12, at 259.
Id. Marine Airways Inc. v. State, 104 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1951); Carmazi v.
Board of Comm'rs, 108 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1959); Moore v. State Road Dept.,
171 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1965).
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is distinguished from the public right of navigation, the
construction of bridges, built upstream or down stream across
the main channel, though not in aid of navigation, have taken
no compensable property, because the right of access does not
extend beyond the edge of the channel."
A rather extreme application of the limitation of the
right of access is presented by the Ohio case of State v. Preston." In that case, a manufacturer had property bordering
a river. The river became harder to navigate the further
inland it went. The manufacturer's plant was built well
inland, so he got a federal permit and dreged a channel across
his property to a connection with the river at a point where
the river was more easily navigable. The state built a bridge
across the channel, cutting off access to the river through
the channel. The court refused compensation, on the grounds
that the manufacturer still had access to the river from the
front of his land, and also that the manufacturer had no such
private rights in the channel as would entitle him to compensation from the state. Perhaps the most eloquent protest to
this type of case was written in an earlier Ohio case, State v.
Masheter36 which also denied compensation on a right of
access-right of public navigation theory. Dissenting judge
Harbert stated:
The majority opinion fails to recognize the importance of and impelling reasons for the development
of navigable rivers in the industrial and agricultural
growth of Ohio... The majority opinion sounds the
death knell for substantial use of land in connection
with the navigability of Ohio's rivers. 7
As a sidenote to the argument that a private citizen cannot sue upon the public right of navigation, the cases of
Coleman v. Schaeffer in Ohio 8 and Day v. Armstrong" in
Wyoming indicate that a private citizen can sue another
private citizen on the public right of navigation. Both cases
involved obstructions to navigation on navigable streams
in which plaintiffs were allowed standing to sue in order
supra note 12, at 259.

34.

NICHOLS,

85.
36.
87.
88.
39.

2 Ohio Op. 2d 244, 207 N.E.2d 664 (1968).
1 Ohio St. 2d 11, 203 N.E.2d 325 (1964).
208 N.E.2d 825, 331; also see DICK. L. REV., supra note 5.
Coleman v. Schaeffer, 163 Ohio St. 202, 126 N.E.2d 444 (1955).
Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961).
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that they might vindicate their rights to navigate the streams
involved. Whether courts will ever construe such opinions
so as to allow suits against the state is open to conjecture,
but cases like Brecton would seem to indicate that the scales
are not tipped for the private riparian in his attempt to
extend the scope of his right of access.
"Public Purpose" Exception to the General Rule:
The following cases, which have been grouped together
as the "public purpose" exception to the general rule of state
navigation servitude, offer a broad interpretation of the scope
of the servitude. Basically, the cases extend the no-compensation aspect of the navigation servitude to any government
project purposes.
An important case illustrative of the "public purpose"
exception is the California case of Colberg, Inc. v. State"
which involved a situation wherein the state built two highway bridges across a riparian shipyard's harbor mouth, thus
cutting off most marine access from the shipyard to deep
water. The California court did not compensate the shipyard
owner for the loss of his right of access, on the theory that
"California burdens property riparian or littoral to navigable
waters with a servitude commensurate with the power of the
state over such navigable waters,"'" and that pursuant to the
exercise of that power "the state ... may act relative to those
waterways in any manner consistent with the improvement
of commercial traffic and intercourse." 2 Compensation is not
necessary if the act of the state "does not embrace the actual
merely in some injurious
taking of property, but results
43
effect upon the property.)
The Colberg court made it very clear that the aspect of
navigation servitude which requires that the taking of riparian property without compensation must be for some project
in aid of navigation is no longer the law in California:
The limitation of the servitude to cases involving a
strict navigational purpose stems from a time when
40.
41.
42.
43.

Colberg v. State, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401, 432 P.2d 3, 11 (1967).
432 P.2d 3 (1967).
Id.
Id.
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the sole use of navigable waterways for purposes of
commerce was that of surface water transport ...
That time is no longer with us.4 4
The only limitation which the Colberg decision placed
upon the navigation servitude was that (as noted previously)
where "the proper exercise of state power [in connection
with navigable waterways] results in actual physical invasion of or encroachment upon fast lands," 4 compensation
must be paid. Obviously, this limitation is not much of a
concession to riparian landowners in California. Generally,
damages to fast lands tend to be consequential, as in the
Colberg situation, where a shipyard was injured consequentially by loss of access to the main river channel. While the
California riparian is protected from physical invasions of
property like flooding or construction of structures, in this
day of vastly increased air, land, and water commerce, his
greatest use for his property would logically seem to be its
utility for navigation to trade routes. The non-compensation
for the loss of these trade routes because of state development
action involving a California river or bay, and covering an
unlimited scope of public purposes would appear to be a
bitter blow for California riparians 6
A different rationale was used in the Mississippi case of
Crary v. State Highway Comm'n. 7 to support the Colberg
concept of the wide scope of the state navigation servitude.
In the Crarycase the state constructed a highway bridge across
a navigable bay. The bridge traversed an area of the bay
in which plaintiffs, as riparian owners, by statute, had been
granted the right to grow and gather oysters on the bed of
the bay. The bridge destroyed part of the oyster bed, and
the plaintiffs argued that the state had made a compensable
taking of their property rights in the oyster bed. The court
held that the destruction of the bed was non-compensable.
Since the court characterized the plaintiff's right to the
oyster bed as a "revocable license,"" it is conceivable that
the court could merely have found that in relation to the
44. Id. at 12.
45. Id. at 13.
46. For a complete criticism on those aspects of the Colberg decision, see 72
DICK. L. REV., supra note 5.
47. 219 Miss. 284, 68 So. 2d 468 (1953).
48. 68 So. 2d at 471.
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state, the revocable license was not a property right as such,
and held for non-compensation on that basis.
However, the court reached the result of the case using
a theory which would encompass the taking of a private
property right. First, the court stated that the water and
beds of navigable waters "belongs to the state as trustee for
the peoples of the state."" Next, the court noted:
When the state implemented its title and responsibilities as trustee, for the public, by constructing this
bridge, it was exercising its paramount and superior
title in the water and soil of the bay, rather than
taking the private property of anyone. It was imposing an additional public use on public lands."
While the above quote specifically states the private
property was not being taken in this instance because the
oyster bed was a part of the bed of the bay, nevertheless
riparians could lose rights of access plus other consequential
private property rights as a result of any kind of state projects
within the confines of the public lands. The term "additional
public use" would seem to comprehend virtually any type
of state project.
To support the "additional public use" basis for its
decision, the court relied upon the rationale that public
(navigable) waters and their beds are like public lands (especially school, district lands)." Public highways built across
school district lands require no compensation to the holder
of leases on the lands, because the highway building is merely
an additional public use on the lands. Thus, if navigable
waters are to be treated as public lands, an additional use
on them also is non-compensable. It should be noted however,
that the court fails to discuss compensation relating to surrounding private lands whose rights of access, etc. might be
affected.
Finally, in a curious twist of logic, the court paid lip
service to the traditional doctrine of navigation servitude,
stating that the principle upon which the case was based
was that:
49. Id. at 470.
50. Id. at 471.
51. Id.
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The United States or a state may construct works in
aid of navigation in the bed of a navigable watercourse, which wholly cut off access from the riparian
land to the water, without incurring any obligation
to make compensation. 2

This would seem to limit the scope of the navigation servitude to projects in aid of navigation, but the" additional public
use" doctrine espoused by the court is much broader. Also,
the state project involved in the Crary case, a highway bridge,
was obviously not in aid of navigation.
In the Crary case, the court was concerned with developing a rationale to deal with the rights of the oyster bed owner
whose property, if such it was, lay in the bottom of the bay.
In developing this rationale, the court created an enormous
scope of state activities in connection with navigable waters
which come under the scope of the navigation servitude, and
hence are non-compensable. Perhaps a fair case can be made
for the equities of not compensating the oyster bed licensee
in this case, but when the doctrine developed by the court is
applied to riparian owners with rights of access and other
property rights which are connected with the privately owned
banks, away from the public land of the bay bed, the equities
for compensation would appear to shift clearly to the riparians
utilizing the banks.
The problem of focusing on the situation of the oyster
bed riparian as opposed to that of the bank riparian can be
illustrated by the state of the law in regard to the scope of
the navigation servitude in Virginia. In the case of Darling
v. City of Newport News," a municipality dumped sewage
into a bay, polluting plaintiff's oyster bed. The loss of the
oyster bed was held to be non-compensable because the dumping of the sewage was a "public right""4 and the exercise of
that right was not "the taking of private property for public
use, but only a lawful exercise of a government power for the
common good."" Therefore, the scope of the servitude with
regard to Virginian waters would appear to be almost unlimited as to the type of activity permitted, as long as the
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 472.
123 Va. Rep. 14, 96 S.E. 307 (1918).
96 S.E. 307, 308.
Id. at 307.
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activity or project was "a lawful exercise of government
power for the common good."" 6
However, in the later Virginia case of Oliver v. City of
Richmond," a bank riparian's right of access was taken for
a state river project directly in aid of navigation. The court
denied compensation on the basis that the project was in aid
of navigation. 8 Recurrently throughout the opinion, the court
stressed the idea that compensation was not granted because
the project involved was in aid of navigation. Logically, the
converse of this statement would be that if aid to navigation
was not the purpose of the project (as in the Darling sewage
dumping situation) compensation would be granted, and
hence, the servitude would be limited to projects in aid of
navigation. The Oliver case did not mention the Darling
decision, so the Darling case would appear not to be overruled
by Oliver.
Therefore, it would seem that Virginia has an inconsistent approach to the scope of the navigation servitude, such
inconsistency very possibly being the result of segregation
of the court's thinking in regard to the rights of bed versus
bank riparians.
It is interesting to note that the Connecticut ease of
Lovejoy v. City of Norwalk, 9 based on the same essential
facts as the Darlingcase, differentiated between the rights of
bed and bank riparians. Though the court held that the oyster
bed owner was not entitled to compensation, the court noted
that "the ownership of such land [the oyster bed], as distinguished from the shore, would be subject to the natural
[public] uses of the water." 0 Therefore, by placing the oyster
bed owners in a special category, the State of Connecticut
should be free to establish the limits of the navigation servitude in regard to bank riparians without being confronted,
as in Virginia, with a broad doctrine which would appear to
encompass the rights of bank as well as bed riparians.6
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Oliver v. City of Richmond, 105 Va. 538, 178 S.E. 48 (1935).
178 S.E. 48 (1935).
Lovejoy v. City of Norwalk, 112 Conn. 199, 152 A. 210 (1930).
152 A. at 213.
For a later Connecticut decision which appears to limit arbitrary state
action even in regard to the rights of the owners of the bed. see: Lovejoy
v. Town of Darien, 131 Conn. 533, 41 A.2d 98 (1945).
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The Crary case, with its public land analogy relating to
the oyster bed 2 appeared to be about to make the bed-bank
distinctions of the Connecticut court, but its final statement
for the proposition that projects in aid of navigation can cut
off riparian rights of access, which are rights held by bank
riparians, without compensation,6" would seem to include the
rights of both bed and bank riparians within the scope of
the servitude.
The final jurisdiction to be considered in this discussion
of the "public purpose" exceptions to the general rule of
state navigation servitude is that of Minnesota. The scope
of the navigation servitude in Minnesota is illustrated by the
statement of the court in Nelson v. Delong :64
The state, as trustee for the people, holds all navigable waters and the lands under them for public
use. Public use comprehends not only navigation by
watercraft for commercial purposes, but the use also
for ordinary purposes of life such as boating, fowling, skating, bathing, taking water for domestic or
agricultural use, and cutting ice."
An example of how Minnesota courts have construed the
scope of the servitude is the case of Minneapolis Mill Co. v.
St. Paul Water Comm'rs.6 in which a city diminished the
flow of a river by drawing off water for municipal purposes,
depriving lower riparians of part of the flow. The court held
that riparian rights were subject to all proper public uses,
that using water for municipal purposes was such a use, and
therefore, the riparians were not entitled to compensation.
Construing the "public use" language of the Minneapolis
Mill case along with the "domestic" and "agricultural" uses
noted by the Nelson case would give an almost unlimited scope
to projects protected by the navigation servitude. Clearly,
the Minnesota court is in basic agreement with the "public
purpose" concept of the cases considered as an exception to
the general rule.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Crary v. State, 219 Miss. 284, 68 So. 2d 468 (1953).
68 So. 2d 468 (1953).
Nelson v. Delong, 213 Minn. 425, 7 N.W.2d 342 (1942).
7 N.W.2d at 346.
Minneapolis Mill Co. v. St. Paul Water Comm'n., 56 Minn. 485, 58 N.W. 33
(1894).
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The Louisiana Exception
In the introduction to this comment, it was stated that
under the doctrine of navigation servitude, one could infer as
a general proposition that the state could not encroach upon
the riparian landowner's property above the high water mark
of the navigable river. Louisiana is in opposition to this
rule. This exception is not a perversion of the common law
navigation servitude, but rather finds its origins in the civil
law of Spain and France. "By the civil law, the banks of
a navigable river are private property, but are subject to
an easement in favor of navigation almost as completely as
the river itself, in that all persons may lawfully tie their
vessels to the bank, unload their cargo thereon, or use the
bank for a tow-path.' ' It is from this law that Louisiana
has, through various constitutional and statutory provisions,
developed the riparian servitude as it exists today."8
The source of this servitude in the State of Louisiana is
Civil Code, which reserves to the state a space along land
riparian to the navigable rivers "for the making and repairing of levees, roads and other public or common works.' "
That this is a valid exercise of the police power seems well
settled in both the Louisiana courts" and the federal courts. 1
Being a valid exercise of the police power, when the servitude
is exercised and land thereby taken or destroyed, compensation is not required. 2 Even though Louisiana has an eminant
domain provision in its constitution" similar to that of the
Federal Constitution," there is no necessity, nor indeed any
right to invoke the eminent domain provisions of either the
67. MIcHOLS, supra note 12, at 237.
68. See: Wolfe, The Appropriation of property for Levees: A Louisiana Study
in Taking Without Just Compensation, 40 TUL. L. REv. 233 (1966), for an
excellent commentary on the source, history and development of the Louisiana law of levee servitudes.
69. LA. STAT. ANN. CIv. CODE § 665 (1952).
70. Bass v. State, 34 La. Ann. 494, 503 (1882).
71. Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452, 468 (1896). "The subject-matter of
such rights and regulations falls within the control of the State, and the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States are satisfied if, in cases like the present one, the state law, with
its benefits and obligations, is impartially administered."
72. 34 La. Ann. 496 (1882) ; Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895); 1
NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN, § 1.42 (3d ed. 1963).
73. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (1921). "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, except by due process of law. Except as otherwise provided
in this Constitution, private property shall not be taken or damaged except
for public purposes and after just and adequate compensation is paid."
74. U.S. CONST., amend. V.
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state constitution or the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the Federal Constitution.
However, if a riparian landowner has his land appropriated by the state, he does have recourse to compensation
through Section 6 of Article 16 of the State Constitution,
which provivdes that lands and improvements "actually used
or destroyed for levee or levee drainage purposes . . . shall
be paid for at a price not to exceed the assessed value for the
preceeding year."7 5 As a result of this provision, and only
because of it, some compensation (but not necessarily market
value) is required when the servitude is exercised.
There is no question but that from earliest times
riparian lands have been subject to this servitude.
There is also no question that but for the provisions
in Section 6 of Article XVI of the Constitution
riparian owners throughout the state would be today
entitled to no compensation whatever for lands taken,
used, or destroyed for levee purposes."
Consequently, Section 6 of Article 16 is looked upon the courts
as ''merely a gratuity."'
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the riparian servitude in Louisiana is the scope of its power. Undoubtedly the
most important case in this area is Wolf v. Hurley78 which
involved the following situation: Because the Mississippi
River was about to change its course, the state engineers
proposed a levee to be built four miles back from the channel
they predicted the Mississippi River would take. Though
the boundary of plaintiff's ranch was two miles from the
river, and the proposed levee two miles farther back from
that boundary, the court held that the scope of the servitude
attached this land because the servitude included "all of that
which is within range of the reasonable necessities of the
situation, as produced by the forces of nature, unaided by
artificial causes. "" It was argued that this rule, when taken
in conjunction with the civil code, would result in destroying
all of the land between the river and the levee and thus
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

LA. CONST. art. 16, § 6 (1921).
Dickson v. Board of Comm'rs, 210 La. 121, 26 So. 2d 474, 479 (1958).
26 So. 2d at 522.
46 F.2d 515 (W.D. La. 1931), afl'd per curiam, 283 U.S. 801 (1931).
Id. at 522.
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requiring compensation under Article 16, Section 6. The
reasoning was that since the code provides that the beds of
the navigable rivers in the state are public property" and
that where there are levees, the levees form the banks of the
river,8 the only logical conclusion would be that the servitude
would extend so as to take all of the property between the
levees and the river; consequently, Section 6 of Article 16
required compensation for all of this property. But the court
disagreed and said that the legislative intent in enacting
Section 6 of Article 16 extended compensation only to what
was "actually used or destroyed" for levee purposes. 2 The
remainder of the property between the levee and the river
is still owned by the landowner, still subject to the servitude.
At first glance, the result of the Wolfe rule is indeed
shocking. But in light of the flat topography of Louisiana
it is understandable why the state has retained such a broad
levee power. The problem which arises is how to decide
when, if ever, land between the river and the levee is destroyed
for purposes of Section 6 of Article 16. The Wolfe court
convincingly argued that " ... it is beyond all reason to say
that where, as here, the levee is moved back four or five
miles, all of the intervening land is actually destroyed.""
The court was, however, realistic enough to foresee situations
where the intervening property might be destroyed for purposes of Article 16, Section 6. "For instance, if the line of
the levee and its drainage, in a farming community, ran
through the middle of a narrow stretch, taking all of it but
a small fraction on either side, the same wivould be effectively
and actually destroyed as a farming unit and the board would
be required to pay therefore." 8 ' Though no reported Louisiana cases have held that compensation must be given for
property other than that actually destroyed for levee purposes, the recognition of the possibility of a compensable
situation by the Wolfe court at least offers hope to situations
which involve an actual destruction of the fastland in between
the levee and the river by the exercise of the servitude. Out80.
81.

LA. STAT. ANN.-CIV. CODE, § 453 (1952).
LA. STAT. ANN.-CIV. CODE, § 457 (1952).

82. Supra note 78, at 523.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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side of this possibility, the Wolfe rule remains as broad as
the Louisiana courts want to interpret it.8"
CONCLUSION

Though this comment has essentially limited itself to a
discussion of the scope of the state navigation servitude doctrine, it should be noted that at least implicitly involved in
any such discussion of the servitude are considerations of
the economic wisdom of the doctrine and its fundamental
equities. The navigation servitude has been referred to as
an exception to the fifth amendment guarantee of just compensation for property taken for public use. What should
be questioned is whether this exception is justified.
It is hopefully manifest that any determination of the
wisdom behind the navigation servitude depends upon the
scope of the doctrine as defined in each particular state; the
more encompassing the scope of the doctrine, the less apparent
is the wisdom. It is common sense that a potential investor
would be less likely to invest in an enterprise involving
riparian property when the very use for which the investment
was made could be swept away by a single legislative enactment. The extreme example of this would be the Public
Purpose exception, which only needs a public purpose to
deprive the riparian property owner of certain of his valuable property rights, especially his right of access. Another
situation is under the Louisiana exception where the state
can take property miles from the actual banks of the river
and thereby appropriate without compensation all the property in between. On the other hand is the General Rule,
which at least guarantees the riparian that his rights cannot
be infringed by the legislature, unless the project is in aid
of navigation.
85. This rule is subject to a somewhat academic limitation which was imposed
by Delaune v. Board of Comm'rs, 230 La. 117, 87 So. 2d 749 (1956). The
case lays down two conditions that a parcel of land must satisfy before the
state can exercise its servitude thereon: 1) "If that grant shows that the
tract was riparian property when separated from the public domain,"; 2)
and if yes, then the inquiry becomes "whether the property taken 'is within
the range of the reasonable necessities of the situation, as produced by the
forces of nature, unaided by artificial causes." This appears to be the law
in Louisiana today as it has been cited with approval and applied to the
facts of two subsequent cases; to wit, Board of Comm'rs v. Baron, 236 La.
846, 109 So. 2d 441 (1959), and Jeanerette Lumber and Shingle Co. v.
Board of Comm'rs, 249 La. 508, 187 So. 2d 715 (1966).
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The alternative to this mass of multi-scope decisions is
that the legislature should take the reins from the courts and
articulate more deliberate and defined law based upon considerations which better reflect the policies of our complex,
modern society.
DANIEL J. MORGAN
DAVID G. LEWIS
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